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Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of pension funds’ performance in Poland and Hungary
as representative Eastern Central European countries. In the theoretical literature
it is argued that investment limits and performance regulations may have a negative
inﬂuence on the performance of funds. In particular for Poland, our empirical ﬁndings
do not support this prediction. Consequently, strict regulations do not necessarily
harm the performance of the pension funds.
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Following the proposal of the World Bank (1994), pay-as-you-go pension systems in Eastern
Central European (ECE) countries have been complemented by a capital market based ele-
ment in the form of privately managed pension funds in the end of the 1990s. Contributions
made by future retirees on their accounts in pension funds, successfully invested in capital
markets, should facilitate accumulation of future pensions and thus reduce the ﬁscal burden
resulting from excessive pension liabilities.
Since the transfer of contributions to a deﬁned contribution system exposes future pen-
sions to a number of market-related and agency risks, ECE governments imposed strict
investment and performance regulations on the pension fund industry (OECD (2006)). In
the ﬁnance literature it is argued that pension funds facing more liberal regulation regimes
are more likely to perform better than pension funds facing stricter investment regimes
(Chan-Lau (2005), Davis (2002)). We investigate empirically to which extent regulations on
the pension fund industry hurt the performance of private pension funds in ECE countries.
Our analysis focuses on the pension fund markets of Poland and Hungary. We explore and
compare the performance of pension funds within and between those markets, using estab-
lished performance measures. A comparison of our results with studies on the performance
of pension funds operating in less stringent regulatory environments enables us to draw con-
clusions on the implications of investment regulations for the pension funds’ performance.
There is scarce, mostly speculative empirical literature discussing the eﬀects of investment
and performance regulation of pension funds on their investment behavior and their portfolio
return performance. The investigations rely on simple descriptive statistics analyzing pension
funds’ portfolio returns and thus do not account for exposure to various types of risk that
may have impact on the conclusions on the performance outcomes (World Bank (2000a,b)).
As to the best of our knowledge, the empirical analysis on Polish pension funds by Stanko
(2003) is the ﬁrst study on a strongly regulated ECE market considering those factors.
However, none of the mentioned studies has accounted for the presence of diverse investment
and performance regulations in these capital markets and no comparative analysis on the
performance implications of these regulations has been achieved.
The paper thus contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: First, it com-
plements the available evidence on institutional investors’ portfolio performance operating
in lax regulatory environments and guided by “prudent man” laws by analyzing the behavior
1of pension funds acting under much stricter regulations. Second, the paper will empirically
contribute to the above mentioned hypothesis about the link between the strength of regu-
lation and portfolio performance, since some of the ECE countries’ regulations are stricter
than others. Third, the paper will have important investment policy implications for the
privately funded pension systems in ECE countries. Finally, this paper is the ﬁrst to pro-
vide a comprehensive comparison of privately managed pension fund performance in ECE
countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the pension fund industry and
the regulations in Poland and Hungary. In section 3 the methodology used to investigate
portfolio performance is outlined. Section 4 describes the data, while section 5 reviews and
interprets the empirical ﬁndings. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Pension Fund Industry and Regulatory Framework
in Poland and Hungary
As pointed out by Chan-Lau (2005), the main determinants of pension funds’ investment
performance may be grouped into three categories: investment regulations, investment prac-
tices and the ability to diversify the portfolios abroad. Below we review those factors in the
context of mandatory pension funds acting on the Polish and Hungarian markets.
The ﬁrst transfer of money to Polish pension funds took place on May 19, 1999. Due to
organizational, as well as ﬁnancial problems, the majority of Polish pension funds started
their activity on the market in June 1999. As of October 1999, the number of active funds
rose from 15 to 21. Due to acquisitions and a merger it was reduced to 15 again, as of
December 2004. The Polish pension fund market is highly concentrated. In terms of market
share, as measured by net assets, the market can be divided into three groups: very large
funds (market share higher than 20%), large funds (market share between 5% and 20%) and
small funds (market share below 5%). In August 2007, the funds Commercial Union (27%)
and ING (23%), representing the group of largest funds, jointly held 50% of the market
share. Approximately a further quarter was held by the group of large funds that included
PZU (14%) and AIG (8%). The remaining quarter of the market was distributed between
11 small funds with market share below 5% (www.knf.gov.pl).
In addition to the prudent man rules, Polish pension fund managers have to follow quan-
2titative investment limits regulated in the Law on Organisation and Operation of Pension
Funds from August 28, 1997. Here we focus on quantitative limits imposed on investment
in particular types of assets and do not review the regulations restricting the concentration
of holding securities of the same issuer. The overall investment in bonds and bills issued by
Treasury and National Bank of Poland is not subject to constraints. A maximum of 40%
of the accumulated assets under management may be invested in shares of domestic listed
companies, in addition, no more than 25% in investment funds. The investment in bank
deposits and foreign assets is limited to a maximum of 20% and 5%, respectively. Investing
in instruments with a low degree of security and liquidity, including derivatives, is limited
to 5%. Investing into real estate is prohibited (UNFE (2000), OECD (2006)).
Table 1 provides data on the quantitative limits faced by the Polish pension funds and
their actual portfolio composition for the period between April 2002 and August 2007. The
quantitative regulations are deemed responsible for the distribution of shares versus bonds in
the funds’ portfolios of about 31% to 64%. The remaining marginal fraction of the portfolios
is dispersed across other asset categories. Table 1 reveals that Polish pension funds diversify
less than they are allowed by the quantitative investment limits. In particular, the fraction of
investment in foreign assets is substantially lower than the legal limit of 5% (www.knf.gov.pl).
Table 1 about here
To guarantee future pension payments, the pension funds’ performances are observed,
evaluated and compared with the industry’s average return on a regular basis by the In-
surance and Pension Funds Supervisory Commission (KNF). Pension funds are required
to guarantee a minimum rate of return on their investments. The Polish law deﬁnes this
mandatory minimum as ”the rate of return lower by 50% than the weighted average rate of
all funds established for a given period, or the rate of return four percentage points lower
than the aforesaid average, whichever is lower”. The measure is calculated and announced
on a quarterly basis for the previous 36-month period. A rate below the required threshold
should be made up from pension funds’ reserve account. If these assets will not suﬃce to
cover the deﬁcit, it has to be ﬁnanced by the so-called Guarantee Fund, which was introduced
to secure future pension payments1 (www.knf.gov.pl).
1Such performance regulations in combination with the high concentration of the pension fund industry
in Poland can be seen as reasons for herding behaviour by Polish pension funds and to similar composition
of the funds’ portfolios. Voronkova and Bohl (2005) investigate this typical feature of the Polish pension
fund market in detail.
3Mandatory pension funds in Hungary were introduced in January 1998 as a second tier
within the new three-tier pension system (World Bank (2007)). Four funds started their
activity on the market during the ﬁrst quarter of 1998. Since 2001 18 mandatory private
pension funds are active on the market, which accumulated about EUR 2.5 billion in assets
under management. The concentration of the Hungarian pension fund market is similar to
the one in Poland. Using the earliest available data, on December 31, 2005 one very large
and four large Hungarian pension funds, holding about 80% of assets, dominated the market,
whilst the very large fund held 25% on its own. The remaining 20% of the market was held
by 13 small funds (www.pszaf.hu). The oligopolistic structure of the Polish and Hungarian
pension fund markets is similar to the one in the UK, where 50% of voluntary pension fund
assets were held by ﬁve managing houses in 2002 (Blake and Timmermann (2002)).
Investment limits in Hungary are somewhat less strict than those in Poland. Holdings
in government bonds and bank deposits are not limited. Investment in domestic stocks and
investment funds is limited to 50% each, investment in foreign assets is limited to 30% and
investment in real estate may reach a maximum of 10%. It is prohibited for pension fund
managers to invest in loans (OECD (2006)). Despite the less restrictive limits Hungarian
pension fund managers diversify their portfolios even less, which becomes apparent from the
data provided in Table 1. More than 75% of assets are invested in government bonds, while
only 10% of assets are held in stocks. As is the case of Polish pension funds, only a minor
fraction of the overall portfolios are invested in foreign assets.
In order to ensure the security of future pensions the Hungarian Financial Supervisory
Authority (HFSA) monitors the pension funds’ performance. Funds are expected to achieve
a minimum rate of return, which is deﬁned as 85% of the return on long-term government
bonds. Funds failing to achieve the performance target for three consecutive years may be
subject to a government enquiry. However, in contrast to Poland, the Hungarian pension
fund managers cannot be held liable for not delivering a minimum rate of return since their
assets are not kept segregated from the participants’ assets. Unlike in Poland, pension
funds in Hungary are subject to long-term performance regulations: the pensions that they
disburse should be at least at the level of 25% of a comparable public pension beneﬁt on the
retirement at the statutory pension age. In particular, after 15 years of participation in a
pension fund, the total pension from the ﬁrst and the second pillar should reach 92% of a
corresponding old-style pension.
4Similar to the Polish pension funds, Hungarian ones suﬀer from a lack of suﬃciently
liquid stock market. The number of stocks listed on Budapest Stock Exchange ﬂuctuated
between 49 and 66 during the sample period. However, the ﬁve most traded shares accounted
for over 80% of the stock market capitalization and around 90% of its turnover (Budapest
Stock Exchange (2006)). This, in combination with the present investment and performance
regulations, has resulted in a very high fraction of domestic bonds in the Hungarian pension
fund portfolios, which amounted to about 70% during our sample period (Hungarian Finan-
cial Supervisory Authority (2005)). This eﬀectively negates the opportunity to invest up to
50% of the portfolio into equities.
Analysis of the portfolio compositions of the pension funds in the two countries shows
that pension fund managers heavily invest in government bonds. Pension funds in both
countries underutilize limited opportunity to invest in stocks and their investments in other
allowed ﬁnancial instruments are minor. Our analysis suggests that investment regulations
do inﬂuence portfolio choices of the pension funds managers and may therefore aﬀect the
performance of the pension funds.
3 Performance Measures
To provide a ﬁrst insight into the investment performance of the pension funds and their
ranking Sharpe (1966) and Treynor (1965) ratios are calculated. While the Sharpe ratio
considers the total risk of a portfolio, the Treynor ratio takes the systematic risk into account.
A well diversiﬁed portfolio features a total risk equal to the systematic risk. Thus, through
a comparison of the two ratios, a rough estimate of the diversiﬁcation capability of the
managers is possible. An identical ranking of the performance measures indicates a high
diversiﬁcation capability.
Detailed information about the portfolio structure of the individual funds is available
for a limited period due to the access to general public information only. Therefore, the
analysis is constrained to established unconditional performance measures based on the
CAPM. Jensen’s (1968) regression:
rit − rft = αi + βi(rmt − rft) + it, (1)
is used to model the unconditional market model. rit is the return of pension fund i at
time t, rft the risk-free rate and rmt the return of the market portfolio. The coeﬃcient αi
5indicates the Jensen’s α of fund i, the coeﬃcient βi denotes its beta. While a positive and
signiﬁcant α indicates a superior risk-adjusted performance of a fund, a negative value reports
an inferior performance assuming that the fund manager potentially does not show stock
selection ability, but timing ability (Cesari and Panetta (2002)). Stock selection ability refers
to the allocation of funds’ assets within diﬀerent investment instruments, whereas market
timing concerns changes of the funds’ asset allocation across those instruments.
In addition to stocks, pension funds’ portfolios contain bonds which have to be taken
into account. This can be achieved by estimating a two-index model, including stock and
bond returns:
rit − rft = αi + β1i(rmt − rft) + β2i(rbt − rft) + it. (2)
The structure of the two-index model can be justiﬁed using two diﬀerent considerations. If
a fund is composed out of three portfolios (stocks, bonds and risk-free assets), its return
is the weighted average of the returns given by the previously deﬁned portfolios. β1i (β2i)
indicates the sensitivity of fund i excess return to a change of the excess return of the stock
index (bond index). Given the two beta coeﬃcients the return of a fund is interpreted as its
excess return compared to the combination of the stock and bond excess returns. αi indicates
the additive value achieved through active management compared to a passive investment
strategy, subject to the same risk (Elton et al. (1993)). Yet, the model may also be seen as
a two-factor equilibrium model, with the stock benchmark and the bond benchmark being
the factors.
In both models (1) and (2), Jensen’s α is aﬀected by the information available to the
manager. Exclusive availability of security-speciﬁc information leaves the measure unbiased.
However, if the management resorts to timing information, its value is generally biased
downwards (Cesari and Panetta (2002)). In order to capture possible market timing ability
of fund managers we apply the approaches by Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and
Merton (1981). The Treynor-Mazuy approach is based on the idea that managers are able
to predict the market trend and the extent of future excess returns. Thus, a fund manager
adapts the beta of the fund continuously to his forecasted market trend. The fraction of the
market portfolio held by the managers increases (decreases) when they expect the general
stock market to rise (fall). In order to capture the timing ability, Treynor and Mazuy (1966)
add the squared excess return of the market portfolio to the basic Jensen regression:
rit − rft = αi + βi(rmt − rft) + γi(rmt − rft)
2 + it. (3)
6ˆ γi = 0 indicates no timing ability, and ˆ γi > 0 that the manager has access to and successfully
uses timing information, while αi measures the share of the fund’s performance achieved
through selectivity. The contribution to the performance of a fund achieved by timing ability
corresponds to the product of the γ coeﬃcient and the variance of the excess market return
σ2
erm. The sum of the selection contribution and the timing contribution is equal to the total
performance. The Treynor-Mazuy approach may only detect timing ability, the structure of
the estimated model complies with the managers’ timing ability. Using a multi-beta-strategy
or the three-factor model by Fama and French (1993) may solve this shortcoming (Prather
and Middleton (2006)).
The Henriksson-Merton approach (1981) is based on the idea that managers use forecasts
of excess market return for the following period, and adjust the beta accordingly. The
product of the excess market return and a dummy variable is added to the basic Jensen
regression:
rit − rft = αi + βi(rmt − rft) + γi(rmt − rft)Dt + it. (4)
The dummy variable Dt takes the value 0 if (rmt − rft) > 0 and -1 if (rmt − rft) ≤ 0. A
positive value of γi indicates that the manager has timing ability. The Henriksson-Merton
approach regards time-varying beta-factors of the Jensen model as evidence for timing ac-
tivity. However, an instability of this risk-measure is not necessarily due to timing activities.
Another critical assumption of the approach is that managers only take the forecasted trend
of the market return into account and not the absolute level of the excess return in order to
determine the beta. The performance achieved by timing and selectivity may be biased, if
their behavior does not correspond to the assumptions of the model.
Since we are not interested in the fund-speciﬁc performance of the pension funds, but
rather in the performance of the whole sector the models are estimated using pooled ordinary
least squares (OLS). Given the the small samples, pooling information across funds has
the potential advantage of gaining power compared to estimates based on a fund-by-fund
analysis (Chevalier and Ellison (1999)). We correct the standard errors by using the method
proposed by Newey and West (1987) with a lag length of three in order to account for
possible heteroscedasticiy and serial correlation. The statistical inference is strengthened by
calculating bootstrapped standard errors, based on a resample of the residuals with 10,000
replications.
74 Data
Our empirical investigation is based on two samples containing panel data of Polish and
Hungarian private pension funds. The sample covering portfolio returns of Polish pension
funds runs from June 1999, the time the majority of funds entered the market, to August
2007. The data for the 52-week t-bill yield, which proxies the risk-free-rate, is available
up to April 2007. The estimations are adjusted accordingly if necessary. The 21 Polish
pension funds can be classiﬁed into survived and discontinued funds. The group of survivors,
containing 15 pension funds, includes those funds active on the market during the whole
sample period. The group of discontinued funds contains those six funds entering the market
late and quitting it before the end of the sample period. The classiﬁcation of the pension
funds allows us to identify the inﬂuence of discontinued pension funds on the aggregate
results. In addition, we may draw conclusions on the behavior of pension funds with respect
to mergers and acquisitions.
The returns of the pension funds, provided by Analizy Online under www.analizy.pl, are
measured as the monthly change in pension funds’ unit value. The end-of-month data of
the Polish total return index WIG and the price index WIG20 are used as proxies for the
Polish stock market portfolio. We use the WIG20 in addition to the WIG, as we expect
pension fund managers to invest heavily in blue chips as a consequence of the existing
investment constraints and performance regulation. In order to incorporate a benchmark
for the returns on bonds held by the funds, the end-of-month data of the Morgan Stanley
Capital International index (MSCI) for Poland, a total return index, is used.
The choice of the benchmark is decisive, as it is diﬃcult to distinguish between bench-
mark ineﬃciency and abnormal returns due to the interdependence between performance
evaluation and the choice of the benchmark (Lehmann and Modest (1987), Grinblatt and
Titman (1994), Blake et al. (2002)). The use of diﬀerent benchmarks provides a possibility
to check the robustness of the estimations. We include the MSCI as an explanatory vari-
able into the two-index model, in order to proxy the proﬁtability of investing in government
bonds, and the corresponding interest income of the funds. Using the MSCI as a benchmark
is important, as managers invest mainly into local government securities. The risk-free rate
as well as the benchmark indices are obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream.
Concerning the sample of Hungarian private pension funds, data are provided by the
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA). The dataset contains quarterly annu-
8alized net rates of returns of 18 mandatory private pension funds from the ﬁrst quarter of
1998 until the last quarter of 2004. Due to the fact that some pension funds only started
their activity on the market after the ﬁrst quarter of 1998 and due to additional missing val-
ues, the set of data is fragmentary. The names of the pension funds are not provided by the
HFSA. Instead, pension funds are identiﬁed by numbers. As a proxy for the risk-free-rate,
we use the one-year discounted t-bill rate. The market portfolio benchmark is proxied by
the Budapest stock index (BUX). In order to incorporate a benchmark for the returns on
bonds held by the funds, the total return index MSCI for Hungary is used. The t-bill-rate
is obtained from Global Financial Data (www.globalﬁndata.com). The BUX and the MSCI
are obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream. For the purpose of the empirical analysis
continuously compounded rates of return are used.
5 Empirical Findings and Comparison with Existing
Literature
Sharpe and Treynor ratios for the Polish pension funds are presented in Table 2. As the
returns of the pension funds are similar to the level of the t-bill rates, the absolute values of
the performance ratios are small. The ratios are mainly positive and have similar rankings.
Indeed, they diﬀer in some cases, but those minor diﬀerences may be neglected since the
correlation between the ranking values is high. This result suggests diversiﬁcation ability of
fund managers. By comparing the survived and the discontinued funds it becomes apparent
that all discontinued funds performed worse than the survived funds. The Treynor ratios
based on the WIG and the WIG20 are highly correlated indicating robust results.
Table 2 about here
All Sharpe ratios and a substantial number of Treynor ratios of Hungarian pension funds,
presented in Table 3, are negative. Those Treynor ratios that are positive result from neg-
ative β-factors. A negative β-factor results from a negative covariance between the excess
return of the pension fund and the excess return of the market portfolio. This indicates a
counter-cyclical investment strategy. The reason for Hungarian pension funds coming oﬀ so
badly here can be seen in the dynamics of the t-bill rate. Unfavorable monetary and ﬁs-
cal conditions over the sample period exerted pressure on the government securities markets
9and caused the Hungarian t-bill rate to be higher than in other Central European countries2.
The rankings of the Sharpe and Treynor ratios of all but one Hungarian pension fund diﬀer
strongly, suggesting a lack in managers’ diversiﬁcation ability. The considerable diﬀerence in
Polish and Hunagrian Sharpe and Treynor ratios indicates that Polish pension funds perform
better than Hungarian ones, despite facing a stricter regulatory framework.
Table 3 about here
The estimated performance measures for Polish pension funds based on the CAPM,
presented in Table 4 in Panel (A), support the conclusions drawn from the Sharpe and
Treynor ratios. The estimated α coeﬃcients of the Jensen model are positive and signiﬁcant,
indicating that the funds’ management created an additional value compared to a passive
investment strategy. The funds outperform the market by 3.71% and 2.11% per annum using
the WIG20 and the WIG, respectively3. The coeﬃcients of the two-index model largely
support the above ﬁndings. As the WIG does account for dividends, while the WIG20 does
not, the diﬀerence in the estimates is not only due to the included stocks.
Table 4 about here
The empirical results for the Treynor-Mazuy and Henriksson-Merton model in Panel
(A) display inconsistent results, depending on the chosen benchmark. Results based on
WIG20 suggest that Polish pension fund managers do not possess any timing ability, while
their selectivity ability remains stable with respect to the ﬁndings of the Jensen and two-
index models. When estimated with the WIG, both models indicate timing ability, but no
selectivity ability. Thus, pension fund managers show a selectivity ability with respect to
“blue chip” stocks and show basically no such ability concerning stocks of smaller companies.
Managers tend to hold stocks of “blue chip” companies, while they trade those of small and
medium size companies. Their intention is to proﬁt by a long-term-investment in “blue chips”
and by timing the rising and falling prices of the remaining stocks of small and medium size
companies, simultaneously. This ﬁnding is in line with the fact that “blue chips” constitute
a signiﬁcant proportion of the funds’ portfolios. Such portfolio structure is attributed to the
2The macroeconomic situation in Hungary is discussed in (IMF (2006); Government Debt Management
Agency (AKK) (2004).
3The estimation of the Jensen model by single funds supports the ﬁndings, and indicates a low dispersion
of the performance measures. We ﬁnd that a high value of net assets does not guarantee the highest
performance. The estimations for single funds are available upon request.
10existence of minimum required rate of return and the resulting security orientation of the
managers (KNF (2007)).
The estimation results for the groups of survived and discontinued Polish pension funds
in Panel (B) and (C) of Table 4 support our ﬁndings by the Sharpe and the Treynor ratio
evidencing a worse performance of discontinued pension funds. While the estimated perfor-
mance measures for survived pension funds are similar to those of the whole market, the
performance measures of the discontinued funds are diﬀerent. According to the Jensen and
the two-index model, discontinued funds are not able to beat the market. In addition, the
results of both timing models deny the managers of discontinued funds any timing ability.
We do not ﬁnd evidence conﬁrming the statement by Chan-Lau (2005) and Davis (2002)
that the performance of pension funds is adversely aﬀected by the strict regulatory frame-
work, in regard to the Polish pension funds. Although our sample period is larger, our
estimation results for the Polish pension fund market are in line with the ﬁndings of Stanko
(2003). Thus, our results seem to be robust with respect to the sample length, showing that
Polish pension funds continuously outperform the market at a constant level in the long-run.
When looking at the Table 5, the estimations of the Jensen model, Hungarian pension
funds were not able to beat the market in the observed period. In fact, they underperform the
market by 5% per annum. The estimations of the two-index model lead to a minor increase
in the α estimate compared to the Jensen model, still indicating that Hungarian pension
funds are not able to beat the market. The estimation results for the Treynor-Mazuy and the
Henriksson-Merton model indicate no timing ability of Hungarian pension fund managers,
as the values of ˆ γ-coeﬃcients are close to zero and not signiﬁcant. This outcome is similar
to the estimations for the Polish market when the WIG20 is used, as BUX and WIG20 are
oﬃcial blue-chip stock indices although they diﬀer in terms of size and number of stocks
included.
Table 5 about here
A number of reasons may cause this evidence of underperformance by Hungarian pension
funds. The relatively short sample period and the dynamics of the t-bill rate might lead to
the negative and insigniﬁcant α-estimates. Hungarian pension fund managers face an illiquid
and small stock market, which limits their diversiﬁcation opportunities. The usage of returns
on government bonds as a benchmark in the Hungarian performance regulation further
aﬀects the portfolio diversiﬁcation, as it keeps security oriented managers from investing
11into assets other than bonds. As a result, Hungarian pension fund members do not beneﬁt
from the proﬁt opportunities available on their domestic stock market (Hungarian Financial
Supervisory Authority, 2007). Such an investment strategy may contribute to a reduction
of the fund returns. Finally, the legislative framework itself has been subject to numerous
changes, providing additional uncertainties for managers and participants (World Bank,
2007). We therefore cannot rule out that performance regulations might have an adverse
eﬀect on the performance of the funds operating on the Hungarian market, aggravated by
the underdeveloped local stock market and instability of the regulation itself.
A comparison of the performance of pension funds active in the strongly regulated mar-
kets of Poland and Hungary with such active in less regulated markets shall give evidence
on whether investment limits and performance regulations in fact harm the performance of
pension funds. We chose the UK market for a comparison, as UK pension fund managers
face probably the fewest externally imposed constraints. This market is, similar to the Polish
market, highly concentrated, providing a proper basis for a reasonable comparison.
Blake et al. (2002) analyze the portfolio composition and performance of UK pension
funds during 1986-1994 using the Jensen regression. UK pension fund managers face no
constraints in regard to their investment decisions. This is reﬂected in the portfolio struc-
ture of the funds, holding a larger portfolio weight in equities and a lower part in bonds
than pension funds in Poland and Hungary. Blake et al. (2002) present a cross-sectional
distribution of unconditional α-estimates, which ranges from -4.59% per annum to 4.68%
per annum. Compared to the present estimates for Polish pension funds, the range of the
values is smaller, regardless of the chosen market portfolio. Less than 50% of the observed
UK pension funds achieve a positive α, whereas the ratio of positive α-parameters of Polish
pension funds is higher than 85%. On average, UK pension funds have an α estimate of -
0.047% per annum. This indicates, that UK pension funds tend to underperform the market
in general.
Besides the UK pension fund market, the US market is much less regulated than the
Polish and Hungarian ones. The empirical ﬁndings by Christopherson et al. (1998) and
Lakonishok et al. (1992) on the performance of pension funds operating on the US market
support our ﬁndings. Despite US pension funds face a less regulated framework, they show
a poor performance in comparison to Polish pension funds. Our ﬁndings on Polish pension
funds that a large amount of net assets does not necessarily guarantee the highest perfor-
12mance, are in line with the results of Blake et al. (2002) and Lakonishok et al. (1992) for
the UK and the US market, respectively. A comparison of the empirical ﬁndings for the
UK, US, Polish and Hungarian pension fund markets with respect to the regulatory frame-
work supports our previous ﬁnding. The argument of Chan-Lau (2005) and Davis (2002) of
regulations having a negative eﬀect on the funds’ performances can not be conﬁrmed.
6 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper is to investigate the inﬂuence of a strict regulatory framework on
the performance of pension funds active on ECE markets. We apply established perfor-
mance measures for a comparative analysis. We ﬁnd evidence of outperformance by Polish
pension funds and signiﬁcant underperformance by Hungarian pension funds, although Hun-
garian pension funds face less restrictive investment limits than their Polish counterparts.
Investment limits and performance regulations inﬂuence the investment decisions of pension
funds. The impact on a fund’s performance, however, depends on the type of the perfor-
mance evaluation benchmark used by the regulation. In Poland it leads to similar portfolio
compositions of the managers, while in Hungary it leads to an exceeding investment into
government securities.
The international comparison suggests that Polish pension funds, despite facing the
strictest regulatory framework compared to Hungary, the UK and the US, outperform the
market, while pension funds active on the compared markets are, in general, not able to beat
the market. Thus, the argument given in Chan-Lau (2005) and Davis (2002) that pension
funds facing no investment restrictions are more likely to perform better than funds facing
stricter regulations can not be supported, relying on our empirical ﬁndings.
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16Table 1: Portfolio Limits on Pension Fund Investment in Selected Asset Categories
Poland Hungary
Asset category Investment Actual port- Investment Actual port-
limits folio share limits folio share
Equity 40.00 31.57 50 9.68





Government Bonds No Limit 63.79 No Limit 75.20
Investment Funds 25.00 0.32 50.00 6.43




Bank 20.00 3.03 No Limit 0
Deposits
Foreign 5.00 0.57 30.00 N.a.
Assets
Note: The table shows the quantitative investment limits and actual shares of assets in the portfolio
for Polish and Hungarian pension funds, indicated as % of the pension funds’ investment portfolios.
The quantitative investment restrictions refer to 2006 for Polish mandatory (open) pension funds
and to 2004 for Hungarian mandatory pension funds (OECD (2006)). The actual shares of assets in
the portfolios of Polish pension funds are calculated using data provided by www.knf.gov.pl. The
shares of assets in Hungarian pension funds portfolios are calculated using the arithmetic average
for all pension funds for the period of 1998 to 2004 given in the dataset provided by the PSZAF.
17Table 2: Sharpe- and Treynor-Ratios of Polish Pension Funds
Sharpe Treynor
Pension Fund Rank WIG20 Rank WIG Rank
Survived Pension Funds, Market Share in %
Commercial Union, 26.65 0.1628 6 0.1650 9 0.1413 8
ING NNP, 23.44 0.1675 5 0.1669 7 0.1454 5
PZU, 13.73 0.1709 3 0.1809 3 0.1489 3
AIG, 8.29 0.1425 12 0.1444 12 0.1238 12
AXA, 4.30 0.1580 10 0.1588 11 0.1377 11
Generali, 3.68 0.1684 4 0.1685 5 0.1429 6
Nordea, 3.52 0.1750 2 0.1896 2 0.1586 2
Bankowy, 3.09 0.1027 15 0.1101 15 0.0976 15
Skarbiec - Emerytura, 2.52 0.1272 13 0.1302 13 0.1146 13
Allianz Polska, 2.46 0.1531 11 0.1619 10 0.1418 7
AEGON, 2.19 0.1592 7 0.1660 8 0.1411 10
Pocztylion, 2.02 0.1250 14 0.1256 14 0.1082 14
Pekao, 1.62 0.1582 9 0.1711 4 0.1455 4
DOM, 1.53 0.1592 8 0.1684 6 0.1413 9
Polsat, 0.96 0.2278 1 0.2381 1 0.2000 1
Average 0.1572 0.1630 0.1392
Discontinued Pension Funds
Arka Invesco -0.2884 20 -0.3797 20 -0.3260 20
Epoka -0.4007 21 -0.6869 21 -0.5865 21
Kredyt Banku -0.0306 18 -0.0342 18 -0.0287 18
Rodzina 0.0363 16 0.0865 16 0.0604 16
ego -0.0207 17 -0.0252 17 -0.0204 17
Pioneer -0.0523 19 -0.1848 19 -0.1336 19
Average -0.1261 -0.2041 -0.1724
All Pension Funds
Average 0.0762 0.0581 0.0502
Note: The maximum length of the sample period is June 30 1999 until August 31 2007. Bold ﬁgures
indicate a change in the ranking of Sharpe- and Treynor-ratios. Survivors are sorted according to their
market share in August 31 2007.
18Table 3: Sharpe- and Treynor-Ratios of Hungarian Pension Funds
Sharpe Treynor
Pension fund Rank BUX Rank
1 -0.3349 1 0.5654 12
2 -0.9032 12 -4.0950 14
3 -2.4869 18 94.8481 1
4 -0.6509 6 1.2730 9
5 -0.7673 9 -9.4016 16
6 -0.7737 10 -1.9371 13
7 -0.5448 4 3.1133 3
8 -1.1744 13 1.7182 5
9 -0.6757 7 1.6192 6
10 -1.5921 15 -4.1980 15
11 -0.8883 11 2.1686 4
12 -0.5967 5 1.5404 8
13 -0.3686 3 0.9318 10
14 -0.3400 2 0.7472 11
15 -1.2894 14 -12.9053 18
16 -1.5941 16 1.5648 7
17 -0.7616 8 -9.4526 17
18 -1.9346 17 6.0912 2
Average -0.9821 4.1218
Note: The maximum length of the sample period is 1998q1 until 2004q4.
All pension funds are considered. For the calculation of the Treynor ratio
the BUX is used as market portfolio. Bold ﬁgures indicate a change in
the ranking. The Treynor ratio of pension fund three is an outlier.
This results from a covariance of the excess return of this funds and the
corresponding excess return of the market portfolio being close to 0.
19Table 4: Pooled Estimates for the CAPM-Based Models by Group of Polish Pension Funds
Model ˆ α ˆ β1 ˆ β2 ˆ γ
(A) All Pension Funds
WIG20 Jensen 0.0371∗∗∗ 0.2520∗∗∗
Two-index, MSCI 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.2354∗∗∗ 0.3302∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy 0.0369∗∗∗ 0.2520∗∗∗ 0.0002
Henriksson-Merton 0.0404∗∗∗ 0.2475∗∗∗ −0.0087
WIG Jensen 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.2968∗∗∗
Two-index, MSCI 0.0187∗∗∗ 0.2772∗∗∗ 0.3157∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy 0.0070∗ 0.2984∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗
Henriksson-Merton 0.0064 0.3195∗∗∗ 0.0444∗∗
(B) Survived Pension Funds
WIG20 Jensen 0.0393∗∗∗ 0.2621∗∗∗
Two-index, MSCI 0.0350∗∗∗ 0.2449∗∗∗ 0.3387∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy 0.0349∗∗∗ 0.2623∗∗∗ 0.0050
Henriksson-Merton 0.0368∗∗∗ 0.2656∗∗∗ 0.0067
WIG Jensen 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.3059∗∗∗
Two-index, MSCI 0.0180∗∗∗ 0.2856∗∗∗ 0.3336∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy 0.0056 0.3069∗∗∗ 0.0234∗∗∗
Henriksson-Merton 0.0035 0.3329∗∗∗ 0.0539∗∗
(C) Discontinued Pension Funds
WIG20 Jensen 0.0091 0.1948∗∗∗
Two-index, MSCI 0.0106 0.1835∗∗∗ 0.2587∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy 0.0338∗∗ 0.1929∗∗∗ −0.0201
Henriksson-Merton 0.0495∗∗ 0.1463∗∗∗ −0.0917
WIG Jensen 0.0084 0.2409∗∗∗
Two-index, MSCI 0.0093 0.2274∗∗∗ 0.2099∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy 0.0108 0.2400∗∗∗ −0.0032
Henriksson-Merton 0.0260 0.2130∗∗∗ −0.0496
Note: The table presents the pooled OLS estimates of the CAPM regressions based on the WIG20
and the WIG as benchmarks for each model and group. All models are estimated with Newey-West
standard errors. The partitioning into groups is the following: In (A) all funds are included, in
(B) only survived funds including late-starters are considered and in (C) only funds that started their
activity later than June 1999 and quit the market prior to July 2005 are considered. *,**,*** represent
estimates signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, 1 %, respectively.
20Table 5: Pooled Estimates for the CAPM-Based Models by Group of Hungarian Pension Funds
Model ˆ α ˆ β1 ˆ β2 ˆ γ
All Pension Funds
BUX Jensen −0.0503∗∗∗ −0.0176∗∗
Two-index, MSCI −0.0459∗∗∗ −0.0340∗∗∗ 0.1501∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy −0.0535∗∗∗ −0.0093 0.0075
Henriksson-Merton −0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0020 0.0295
Note: The table presents the pooled estimation results of the CAPM-models for the Hungarian pension
funds with the BUX used as benchmark. All models are estimated with Newey-West standard errors.
*,**,*** represent estimates signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, 1 %, respectively.
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